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U.S. NAVY SURFACE BATTLE DOCTRINE AND
VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC
Trent Hone
The basic strategic problems confronting the U.S. Navy during the interwaryears of the 1920s and 1930s were how to move a large fleet across the Pacific,
absorb or avoid Japanese attritional attacks, seize forward bases for further oper-
ations, and retain sufficient fighting strength to defeat Japan’s Combined Fleet.
Japanese and American policies in Asia were in conflict, and war was a possible
result; the U.S. Navy planned to win by destroying Japan’s navy, imposing a
blockade, and forcing Japan’s surrender. Details of the strategic dilemma were
the focus of interwar plans, large fleet maneuvers, and complex war games at the
Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island. By the time war arrived in 1941,
the concept of an advance across the Pacific had become the subject of extensive
and detailed strategic planning.1
However, the fleet that advanced through the Pacific in World War II was not
the fleet of prewar plans. The prewar Navy had centered on a battle fleet, a
battleship-centric formation that, concentrated together with a large fleet train,
would move as a unit, seizing objectives along its path.2 By early 1943, a new and
more effective fleet organization had become available. Fast carrier task forces
had demonstrated their ability to form powerful strik-
ing forces, maneuver independently of slower assault
shipping, and force a decision on their own.3 The fleet
that took the war to Japanese shores was built around
carrier task forces.
It is generally assumed that the change from a
battleship-centric formation to carrier task forces
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invalidated the strategic and tactical planning carried out before the war, but
this view is incorrect. The continuity in the Navy’s strategic planning has already
been illustrated by Edward Miller’s War Plan Orange; a similar continuity can be
found in tactical plans and doctrine.4 Although the relatively high speed and
flexibility of carrier task forces gave them operational maneuverability signifi-
cantly greater than that of the battleship formations that preceded them, the ba-
sic tactical principles that the Navy employed in its battle doctrines remained
unchanged.
The changes were confined to the method of applying and distributing these
principles. Two important factors combined to temper the prewar concepts and
produce a new approach. The first was the flexibility afforded by carrier task
forces and the way they could concentrate against multiple targets simulta-
neously or against a single target without becoming a single target themselves.
The second factor was wartime experience. By late 1942, the Navy’s prewar ap-
proach to the development and dissemination of tactical doctrine had shown se-
rious flaws. Ships and men were going into battle without the proper
indoctrination, limiting their effectiveness.5 A new approach was needed; the
Navy’s Pacific Fleet was the first to synthesize all three elements: the necessity of
a new approach to tactical doctrine, the challenge introduced by fast carrier task
forces, and existing prewar doctrinal concepts. These were married together by
new tactical manuals, new fleet organizations, and refined battle plans. Together,
these elements enabled success in the rapid string of offensives that moved
through the Central Pacific, returned American forces to the Philippines, and
crushed Japan as a naval power.
OFFENSIVE IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC
In early 1943, the Pacific War was entering a new phase. The Pacific Fleet, under
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, had defeated the Japanese in the attritional struggle
for Guadalcanal and forced them onto the strategic defensive. It was essential
that Nimitz’s forces seize the opportunity afforded by their success and begin a
strategic offensive, if they were to maintain the initiative.6
The Central Pacific would be the objective of the new offensive. Before the war,
both sides had recognized the strategic importance of the Marshall, Caroline, and
Mariana island groups, collectively known as the Mandates.7 The islands occupied
a central position and provided numerous bases. The Navy could use these to sup-
port further offensives in the direction of the Philippines, Formosa, or Japan itself.
It was estimated that the seizure of the Mandates would “make available . . . ap-
proximately 20 airfields, 15 seaplane bases, 8 submarine bases, and 10 fleet an-
chorages.”8 Accordingly, in June 1943 Nimitz was directed by the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff (JCS) to develop a plan to penetrate the Japanese perimeter; the initial tar-
get would be the Marshall Islands.9
The campaign plan Nimitz and his staff developed stressed two specific oper-
ational goals—a rapid pace of operations that would pressure the Japanese and
keep the initiative firmly within the Pacific Fleet’s grasp, and a decisive show-
down with the Japanese fleet. GRANITE, as the plan was code-named, stressed
both of these objectives, emphasizing the need to maintain “unremitting pres-
sure against Japan” and seeking the destruction of “the Japanese Fleet at an early
date.”10
The fast pace of operations presented several challenges. It would be neces-
sary to keep the striking arm of the fleet in forward areas almost continuously;
this required a new approach to logistics.11 Increased tempo also required a new
approach to the development and dissemination of tactical doctrine. The pre-
war concept of a fleet that would move through the Pacific as a cohesive unit had
to be discarded.12 To sustain the rapid pace of operations, individual ships and
small task units would have to be interchangeable. They would have to move out
of forward areas without disrupting the pace of the offensive; they would have to
move into the combat zone and be effective immediately; and they could not be
expected to spend adequate time training with their cohorts. Further exacerbat-
ing these issues was the need for ships of the Pacific Fleet to support two major
offensives in two theaters simultaneously.13 A new tactical manual, Current Tac-
tical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Pacific Fleet, known as PAC 10, would help resolve
these issues.
Victory in a major fleet action is commonly assumed to have been a tactical
objective of the Pacific Fleet, but the GRANITE plan illustrates that it was a strate-
gic goal.14 “All operations will be conducted as to maintain maximum readiness
to take advantage of opportunities to bring important enemy naval forces to ac-
tion.”15 The Japanese fleet was a credible fighting force, and so long as it could
sortie and threaten the success of an amphibious operation, it would limit the
Pacific Fleet’s freedom of maneuver. Operational and tactical plans had to ac-
count for this contingency. Thus GRANITE assumed that “a major fleet action, al-
though it may delay amphibious operations for a brief period, will greatly
accelerate them thereafter.”16
The movement into the Mandates was expected to draw out the Japanese fleet
and enable its destruction. Every subsidiary operation plan to GRANITE—in-
cluding GALVANIC for the invasion of the Gilberts, FLINTLOCK and CATCHPOLE
for the Marshalls, HAILSTONE for Truk, LONGHOP for Manus, and FORAGER for
the Marianas—therefore had to account for the possible opportunity of decisive
action. Tactical and operational plans were developed to meet this contingency.
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PREWAR EXPERIENCE AND DOCTRINE
The Navy’s existing tactical doctrine provided a backdrop for offensive prepara-
tions. Sophisticated and nuanced after refinement in the interwar period, this
doctrine emphasized major fleet action and relied on several fundamental prin-
ciples, including tactical concentration and coordinated action against the
enemy.17
The doctrine’s set of “major tactics,” those for a large fleet in battle, were thor-
ough and flexible; they covered a variety of contingencies apart from the main
fleet action. Cruisers and destroyers were drilled in “night search and attack”
procedures, designed to locate and damage an enemy battle fleet the night before
a battle.18 Battle-line aircraft carriers operated with the battle fleet, providing air
cover for the battleships and fleet train.19 Independent carrier task forces per-
formed reconnaissance and targeted their opposite numbers to establish aerial
superiority. Submarines scouted ahead and attacked enemy surface vessels.20
But the main emphasis of major tactics was the complex ballet of a battle-line
action. Battle plans emphasized the cooperation of all fleet units to destroy the
main objective—the enemy battle line. The publication of Tentative Fleet Dispo-
sitions and Battle Plans, 1930 introduced a new level of complexity and coordi-
nation.21 For the first time, the Navy had standard plans to govern the entire fleet
in action. The new plans were further refined by General Tactical Instructions,
United States Navy (FTP 142) in 1934 and by General Tactical Instructions,
United States Navy (FTP 188) in 1940.
Battle plans were designated by a system of coded numbers and letters. The
first number would determine the overall type of action to be fought. A normal
action on similar courses—that is, with the Navy’s battle line steaming in the
7 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
FIGURE 1
TYPICAL BATTLE FORMATION
Source: Operation Plan 12-44, p. J-I-7.
Note: DD = destroyer, DesRon = destoyer squadron; Deg = degrees relative to enemy bearing.
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same direction as that of the enemy—was indicated by 1. The numeral 2 indi-
cated a reverse action, with the Navy’s battle line moving in the opposite direc-
tion and chasing the enemy’s tail. Reverse actions were believed to offer
significant advantages, because the Japanese were expected to put fast and pow-
erful forces in the van of their line; if the battle moved away from them, their ef-
fectiveness would be reduced.22 Other numbers were used for more complex
situations.23 After the number followed a letter that prescribed a specific range
band: E indicated a fight at extreme range, twenty-seven thousand yards and
above; L signified long range, twenty-one to twenty-seven thousand yards; M
was for medium range, seventeen to twenty-one thousand yards; and C meant
close range, seventeen thousand yards and below. Other letters provided details
on the use of supporting forces.24 Common plans, such as “1L,” a normal action
at long range, and “2M,” a reverse action at medium range, were described in
detail.25
All these scripted plans assumed the same basic battle formation, a focused
concentration of offensive power. Battleships were positioned in the center, with
their broadsides facing the enemy (see figure 1); light forces—groups of cruisers
and destroyers—were positioned on either flank. A group of destroyers was gen-
erally retained with the battle line to provide close protection against enemy de-
stroyers and submarines. Carriers and ships of the fleet train would position
themselves on the far side of the battle line from the enemy.26 The intent was to
allow all elements of the fleet to cooperate, to fight as a unit toward the common
goal of destroying the enemy battle line.
Concentration of the battle fleet was particularly vital to success in a gunnery
action, and the battle formation reflected this. Although the range and accuracy
of battleship guns increased during the interwar period, battleships had to
group together to maximize their fighting power.27 Experiments during tactical
exercises were conducted with distributed formations, but results had repeat-
edly shown that dispersion invited defeat in detail. Accordingly, concentration
had become a doctrinal tenet.28 A concentrated formation maximized the offen-
sive power of not only the battle line but also the other fighting units that made
up the battle fleet.
The lessons of the interwar period had also led to an emphasis on combined
arms—coordinated attacks on the enemy formation by all elements of the fleet,
including battleships, destroyers, and airplanes.29 For a time submarines and
minelayers were even considered important elements of a major fleet action.30
All available weapons were to be used in concert. Admiral Harris Laning, writing
in his 1933 pamphlet on fleet action, emphasized this point: “With so many
weapons carried on such different types of ships it is apparent that if we are to
get the maximum effect of all weapons and make our blow the sum total of the
H O N E 7 1
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blows of all, there must be perfect coordination between the types carrying
them.”31
The effectiveness of each individual attack, then, was expected to be increased
by coordination with other types. This was particularly true of attacks by air-
planes and destroyers; under normal circumstances enemy battleships were be-
lieved capable of thwarting them through a combination of defensive fire and
maneuver, but when combined with battleship gunfire, aircraft and destroyers
were considered to be far more effective.32 Coordinated attacks using planes, de-
stroyers, and the guns of battleships were a recurring feature of the Navy’s Fleet
Problems and tactical exercises. The idea of using aircraft and surface ships in
concert to destroy an enemy fleet became an essential feature of the Navy’s plans
for decisive battle.33
Submarines were another important element of the Navy’s plans in the inter-
war period. They had long been considered for use in major actions, but the spe-
cifics of how they were to be employed had not been resolved. Early plans had
envisioned using them as a tactical scouting force for the fleet, sailing ahead to
report on and attack approaching enemy ships.34 This proved difficult to imple-
ment; submarines were too slow. In general, their usefulness in fleet operations
proved limited. Wartime commanders would adopt a new solution.
WARTIME LESSONS
Opportunities for the employment of “major tactics” were lacking in the two
years following Pearl Harbor. The combat that did occur—furious battles of
light forces and long-range carrier duels—revealed flaws in the Navy’s prewar
approach to the development and dissemination of tactical doctrine.
Minor Tactics
In contrast to preparations for decisive battle, “minor tactics”—those that
would govern the employment of smaller forces—were neglected before the war.
Very limited doctrinal guidance was provided for minor actions at the fleet level.
Instead, individual squadron and task force commanders were expected to de-
velop combat doctrines and battle plans themselves for the employment of their
forces.35
This mechanism worked well under prewar conditions, when formations
were cohesive and had time to drill under individual commanders. Where these
circumstances held in wartime, the Navy’s light forces were effective in battle.
The performances of Commander Paul H. Talbot’s Destroyer Division 59 at
Balikpapan and Rear Admiral Norman Scott’s Task Force (TF) 64 at Cape
Esperance are worthy examples. In both these cases, the forces involved were fa-
miliar with their commanders’ doctrines and were able to practice together
7 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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before going into action.36 In the latter half of 1942, however, combat losses, the
pace of operations in the Pacific, and the demands of a two-ocean war made this
increasingly difficult. The climactic battles for Guadalcanal in November 1942
saw ships thrown together in haste; commanders had no time to develop com-
mon doctrine or plans, and the resulting losses were severe.37 It became obvious
that the development of “minor tactics”could not be left to commanders at sea.
The Pacific Fleet’s initial approach to addressing this problem was inade-
quate. “Tactical bulletins” and “confidential letters” on specific topics were pro-
duced and distributed to fleet units. These documents modified, enhanced, or
introduced procedures that reflected lessons of combat and experience with new
tactics and techniques. They covered a variety of topics—major action plans,
night battle tactics, the use of radar, and the introduction of the Combat Infor-
mation Center. Their proliferation, however, led to redundancy and inconsis-
tency.38 By 1943, war experience had shown that a comprehensive revision of
tactical manuals was necessary.
Carrier War
The Navy’s carrier battle doctrine was effective enough to allow operational, if
not tactical, success in all the major carrier battles of 1942. However, lessons
from combat illustrated that improvement was necessary, particularly in the co-
ordination of multiple carriers within a single formation.39 The Navy had lim-
ited experience with task forces containing multiple carriers. For much of the
interwar period, the Navy had had only two large carriers for experiments and
exercises, Lexington and Saratoga. During Fleet Problems, they were regularly
placed on opposite sides; when teamed together, they operated in independent
task groups or were tied to the battle line.40
Technological factors also contributed to the Navy’s lack of experience in this
respect. Before the advent of radar and effective fighter-direction techniques,
carriers were best protected by keeping them hidden. A carrier that had been lo-
cated could be struck and rendered inoperable by an enemy attack. Dispersing
carriers into separate strike forces, away from the main body and each other, was
a logical defensive measure.41 The war and the advance of technology changed
the situation. Improved radars to detect incoming strikes and more effective
techniques for vectoring fighters to intercept them allowed groups of carriers to
pool resources and offer mutual support. The Navy’s carrier task force doctrine
was revised on the basis of these developments and of lessons from the 1942 bat-
tles. Single-carrier formations were abandoned; task forces were formed around
multiple carriers operating together.42
Even more fundamental changes would occur. Fast carrier task forces became
the basis of the offensive power of the Pacific Fleet. The shift to carrier task
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forces and away from a battle fleet offered opportunities. For instance, because
each of the carrier task forces could operate independently, it was possible to dis-
perse them and strike multiple targets simultaneously. This would help achieve
one of the major operational goals of the offensive, a rapid tempo. However, this
was not without risk; carriers were still considered vulnerable to surface action,
and they needed support during their thrusts into the enemy’s defensive perim-
eter.43 The new, fast battleships were ideally suited to provide this support, and
they would be made part of the carrier task forces.
The dispersal of battleship strength, however, ran counter to the principle of
concentration the Navy had emphasized for decades. It introduced the risk that a
lone carrier task force might be isolated and destroyed; it also made it essential
that the carrier task forces concentrate prior to major fleet action in order to
bring the battleships together. Thus, although dispersal enabled the rapid pace
of operations, it hindered the second goal, the need to bring the Japanese fleet to
decisive action. An approach that balanced the two factors was necessary.
THE NEW APPROACH
A combination of approaches was used to satisfy the operational goals of the
Central Pacific offensive. New fleetwide tactical manuals were developed that
covered “minor tactics” and the operations of small task forces; the common
doctrines they established allowed for the interchangeability of ships and task
units demanded by the rapid operational tempo. Operation plans called for the
seizure of multiple objectives but also acknowledged the need to concentrate for
decisive action. Tactical plans emphasizing concerted action against the enemy
prepared the Navy for the expected battles. Together, these methods ensured the
success of the offensive in the Central Pacific.
In April 1943, Nimitz created a board to revise the Pacific Fleet Cruising In-
structions. The officers of the board were ordered to review current doctrinal
publications, examine combat reports, interview officers returning from com-
bat zones, and produce a new set of cruising instructions.44 They would in fact
exceed this authority. By drawing on operational goals of the coming campaign,
existing principles of the Navy’s doctrine, and doctrinal flaws exposed by war-
time experience, the board produced a new doctrinal manual for the Pacific
Fleet, and the most important one issued by the wartime Navy.
Although carrier airpower would dominate the coming offensive, Nimitz
chose three surface officers for the board and only one aviator. The senior mem-
ber, Rear Admiral Robert M. Griffin, was an experienced surface warfare officer
(as they are known today). He left the board before it completed its work, going
on to command Battleship Division 3.45 Captain Roscoe F. Good became senior
member with Griffin’s departure; later in the war he would command the
7 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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battleship Washington.46 Captain E. M. Crouch replaced Griffin.47 As com-
mander of Destroyer Division 57, Crouch had survived the initial Japanese of-
fensives in the South Pacific.48 The aviator was Captain Apollo Soucek, who had
served with distinction on the carrier Hornet and at the time of its loss had been
its executive officer.49 It was their labors that would produce Current Tactical Or-
ders and Doctrine, U.S. Pacific Fleet, PAC 10.
PAC 10, issued in June 1943, provided what the Navy had been missing—a
common set of tactical principles for the cooperation of small forces and de-
tached units in battle. It corrected the underemphasis on “minor tactics,” grant-
ing them the same detailed treatment that major actions had received for over a
decade.50 The coded system of letters and numbers used for major actions was
recycled and applied to small task forces. Compact battle formations developed
specifically for combat by such forces were presented.51 Existing battle forma-
tions for light forces in night combat were retained.52
Instead of having to create and distribute their own tactical doctrines, small
task group commanders could now develop battle plans rapidly, having a com-
mon doctrine to which they could refer. This streamlined the process, relieved
small-unit commanders of an unnecessary burden, and ensured a common
approach.53
Now, new ships could familiarize themselves with PAC 10 as they prepared to
join the fleet and, because the manual applied to all task forces in all Pacific com-
bat zones, it became possible to move ships from group to group or theater to
theater without reequipping them with lengthy instructions by their new com-
manders. This was an extremely important development, and it was stressed in
the manual’s introduction.
PAC-10 is intended . . . to obviate necessity for . . . special instructions under ordi-
nary circumstances and to minimize them in extraordinary circumstances. The ulti-
mate aim is to obtain essential uniformity without unacceptable sacrifice of
flexibility. It must be possible for forces composed of diverse types, and indoctrinated
under different task force commanders, to join at sea on short notice for concerted
action against the enemy without exchanging a mass of special instructions.54
Successors to PAC 10 built upon the foundation that the original provided. In
February 1944, the U.S. Fleet followed the lead of its Pacific arm and issued Cur-
rent Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet, known as USF 10A.55 USF 10A built
directly upon PAC 10: its format, structure, and the majority of its contents were
unchanged from the Pacific Fleet’s publication.56 Although its title implied that it
was an amendment of the prewar USF 10, Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine,
United States Fleet, the new manual shared very little with its predecessor and
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provided far more tactical detail.57 A revision, USF 10B, followed in May 1945,
introducing additional wartime lessons.58
THE OFFENSIVE BEGINS
With PAC 10 the fleet solved two significant problems. First, as noted, the cre-
ation of a single, common doctrine allowed ships to be interchanged between
task groups, and this in turn enabled the rapid operational tempo Nimitz de-
sired. Second, shifting the development of small-unit tactical doctrine to the
fleet level and out of the hands of individual commanders increased the effec-
tiveness of all units, particularly the fast-moving carrier task forces. Tactical and
operational plans for the coming offensive were built on this foundation.
GALVANIC
Although the JCS directive ordered the seizure of positions in the Marshalls,
Nimitz considered a thrust directly into the island group too dangerous. Too lit-
tle was known about Japanese positions; experience had demonstrated the im-
portance of reconnaissance before amphibious landings, and the Marshalls were
too far away for land-based planes to photograph the targets.59 An intermediate
objective was needed. Nimitz and his planners chose the Gilbert island group,
formerly a British possession, recently seized by the Japanese. The code name for
the operation was GALVANIC.
Nimitz’s Central Pacific Force, augmented by ever-growing numbers of new
ships and aircraft, was by November 1943 ready to begin major offensive opera-
tions. Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance had assumed command on 5
August.60 The relative inexperience of the growing fleet had made a comprehen-
sive doctrine for tactical operations imperative. Most of the ships of the force
were new, the majority of their officers were reservists, and many of the men had
never been to sea before.61 These ships could not operate as a cohesive unit with-
out a doctrine to guide them, particularly if the Japanese sought a fleet action.
The possibility of fleet action heavily influenced plans for GALVANIC. The Cen-
tral Pacific Force would seize three atolls: Tarawa, Makin, and Abemama. Posses-
sion of these would guarantee American dominance of the Gilbert Islands and
provide airfields from which to reconnoiter and attack the Marshalls. Although
long-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft could reach the Gilberts, the ex-
treme range forced Spruance to provide direct air support for the invasion forces
with his fast carrier task forces.62 This severely limited the carriers’ freedom of
maneuver. In prewar exercises, combat forces caught while supporting amphibi-
ous assaults had been damaged by attritional raids and then defeated by major
attacks.63 At Savo Island, the Japanese had reinforced these lessons by decimat-
ing an Allied covering force.64 Japanese responses in the Central Pacific were ex-
pected to be even more powerful.65 Minor raids could be handled by the invasion
10
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forces, using PAC 10 as a guide, but a major Japanese response would be a serious
threat.66
Spruance’s GALVANIC plan accounted for this possibility. The main objectives
would be seized simultaneously, Tarawa by the Southern Attack Force and
Makin by the Northern. The atolls were expected to be occupied before the Japa-
nese could mount a major response.67 Simultaneous attacks divided his forces,
but the best defense against the threat of attack in the middle of an amphibious
operation was to overwhelm the objectives quickly, granting the fleet freedom to
maneuver; this also satisfied the desire for a rapid operational tempo.
The potential for a major action was very real. Powerful Japanese forces based
at Truk in the Caroline Islands could quickly move into the Marshalls and chal-
lenge the invasion. Estimates suggested that the Japanese could oppose the at-
tack with ten battleships, seven aircraft carriers, and supporting forces.68
“Current Intelligence indicates the presence of the major portion of the Japa-
nese Fleet in the Truk area at the present time. Whether this fleet can or will be
used to interfere with GALVANIC we do not know. . . . [W]e must be prepared at
all times during GALVANIC for a fleet engagement.”69
Over a hundred miles separated Tarawa and Makin; the forces covering the
assaults were too far apart to provide mutual support, unless Spruance had
timely warning of a Japanese approach. He was extremely apprehensive that a
powerful attack would fall on a portion of his force and defeat it in detail. Of the
two island objectives, Makin was closer to the Marshalls and much more vulner-
able to a Japanese response. Spruance expected air searches to give him adequate
warning and allow concentration of the Central Pacific Force. If weather pat-
terns were unfavorable, however, storm systems could prevent aerial searches in
the direction of the Mandates; Spruance considered delaying the attack on
Makin if such circumstances developed.70
Even if they did not, however, the forces around Makin had to be ready to de-
fend themselves. Spruance placed significantly more firepower in his northern
groups. The old battleships in the Northern Attack Force, Idaho, Mississippi, and
New Mexico, had been extensively modified before the war and were the most
powerful of the old battleships available.71 In addition, all six fast battleships
supporting the operation were near Makin, evenly divided between the carrier
task group providing direct support to the attack and the “interceptor” carrier
group.72 The latter, under the direct command of Rear Admiral Charles A.
Pownall, Spruance’s carrier force commander, was positioned to intercept Japa-
nese aerial attacks and provide early warning of enemy forces approaching from
the Marshalls.73 Spruance urged these carrier groups to remain concentrated:
“Carrier Task Groups which are screened by fast battleships and are supporting
the attack on Makin and covering our northern flank will . . . be operated in as
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close tactical support as possible of each other and the combatant units of the
Northern Attack Force.”74
If the Japanese sought battle, the nine battleships in the north could separate
from their task groups and unite to form a powerful battle line under Rear Ad-
miral Willis A. Lee.75 But this was not Spruance’s desired approach. He wanted a
margin of superiority over his foe, and his battle plan called for the entire Cen-
tral Pacific Force to come together to counter any major Japanese move.76 Three
old battleships and additional ships supporting the landing at Tarawa would
join the forces around Makin, giving Spruance a battle fleet of twelve battleships,
nine heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and twenty-eight destroyers.77 It is im-
portant to emphasize that this battle fleet drew not only from the fast carrier
groups but also from the invasion forces. As it would form on the spot, common
doctrine would be essential.
Spruance’s GALVANIC plan emphasized the importance of destroying the Jap-
anese fleet, and it echoed the goal of the GRANITE campaign.
If . . . a major portion of the Japanese Fleet were to attempt to interfere with GAL-
VANIC, it is obvious that the defeat of the enemy fleet would at once become para-
mount. Without having inflicted such a defeat on the enemy, we would be unable to
proceed with the capture and development of Makin, Tarawa, and Apamama [sic].
The destruction of a considerable portion of Japanese naval strength would . . . go far
toward winning the war.78
In fact, the Japanese too anticipated a major fleet action. Prior to GALVANIC,
when Central Pacific carrier task forces had raided Tarawa, Makin, and Wake Is-
land, Admiral Mineichi Koga, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, cor-
rectly anticipated that these actions signaled the start of an offensive. Twice—in
September and again in October—he moved the bulk of his forces from his main
base at Truk to Eniwetok in the Marshalls, ready to counter Spruance. Each time,
when the expected offensive did not occur, Koga returned to Truk.79 By the time
of the landings on 20 November, Koga was no longer prepared. In late October,
faced with a threat to his southern flank by Allied advances toward Bougainville,
Koga reinforced the bastion of Rabaul.80 He sent his carrier squadrons there,
along with most of his cruiser forces.81 Nimitz’s rapid operational tempo was de-
livering results. Frequent raids had kept the Japanese guessing about where the
first blow would fall, and, pressured on two fronts, they chose to reinforce their
southern flank. When Spruance moved into the Gilberts, stripped of its air
squadrons and cruiser scouts, there was little the Combined Fleet could do. The
looked-for decisive action did not materialize.
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FLINTLOCK
With the success of GALVANIC, attention quickly shifted to the Marshalls. The
important question was how best to continue the rapid pace of the offensive and
quickly neutralize Japanese positions in the island group. The essential initial
objective was an airfield that could support bombers; there were bomber air-
fields on Wotje and Maloelap in the eastern portion of the Marshalls. A phased
approach, breaking the capture of the Marshalls into eastern and western opera-
tions, was considered and endorsed by the JCS.82 Nimitz and his planners re-
jected this idea; they did not want the offensive to degenerate into an attritional
struggle like the fighting in the Solomons.
As plans for the Marshalls were refined, concurrent raids struck Japanese po-
sitions; PAC 10 facilitated these minor operations.83 Lee’s fast battleships were
detached from the carrier task forces and moved to the South Pacific; along the
way, they bombarded the Japanese base on Nauru, west of the Gilberts. Pownall
led two of his carrier groups into the heart of the Marshalls, attacking the
Kwajalein and Wotje atolls. Raids like these sustained the operational tempo.
Pownall’s strikes destroyed planes, sank ships, and damaged installations, but
their most valuable achievement was a photograph of a large airstrip the Japa-
nese were constructing on Kwajalein Island. This proved what none had ex-
pected, that a bomber airfield could be built on Kwajalein.84
Plans to capture the Marshalls in one operation were quickly finalized.
Kwajalein, the centerpiece of the Japanese defensive position, would be seized;
the eastern Marshalls would be isolated and left to wither on the vine.
FLINTLOCK, as the operation was code-named, required three attack forces. The
first two would strike Kwajalein; the northern element would assault the twin is-
lands of Roi-Namur, while the southern would capture Kwajalein Island, on the
southern end of the atoll. The third force would occupy undefended Majuro
Atoll, which would become a local anchorage for assault forces, and be an opera-
tional reserve. The reserves would be held ready to assist in the capture of
Kwajalein; if not needed there, they would take part in Operation CATCHPOLE,
the assault on Eniwetok.85
The fast carrier task forces, now designated TF 58, had a new commander for
FLINTLOCK, Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher. As in GALVANIC, they had to oper-
ate in direct support of the assault forces, but the previous approach of teaming a
carrier task force to an assault objective was discarded. Pinning carriers to physi-
cal objectives restricted their mobility, and the decision had been criticized.86
Mitscher would operate his carriers offensively in the Marshalls, rotating be-
tween supporting landings and neutralizing Japanese air bases.87 Two of these
carrier groups were kept near the main objectives at Kwajalein Atoll, close
enough to concentrate quickly for mutual support. On 29 January 1944, Task
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Groups (TGs) 58.2 and 58.3 attacked Kwajalein. The next day, TG 58.1 replaced
TG 58.3, and the latter moved to Eniwetok, farther to the west and closer to Truk.
These relative positions were held until TG 58.3 retired to fuel on 3 February.88
The use of TG 58.3 as the advanced guard was deliberate. That group con-
tained the two newest battleships, Iowa and New Jersey. The fastest and most
powerful in the fleet, these two battleships constituted Battleship Division 7.
Their high speed, over 32.5 knots, allowed them to keep pace with the fast carri-
ers.89 With Battleship Division 7, TG 58.3 could outfight any enemy surface force
it could not outrun. If a major Japanese counterattack ensued, the task group
would fall back on Kwajalein. The remaining six fast battleships were divided
evenly between TGs 58.1 and 58.2.
Major action was once again anticipated. This was the first advance into the
Mandates, which were known to be an important element of Japanese defensive
strategy. In prewar plans, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel had expected to entice
the Japanese to battle in the Central Pacific by threatening their position in the
Marshalls.90 Now Nimitz expected to do the same with the much larger and
more powerful Central Pacific Force.
Spruance’s battle plan for FLINTLOCK again called for the concentration of all
fifteen available battleships, new and old, into a single battle line.91 Supporting
units would be drawn from both the invasion fleet and the carrier groups. To
guide the fleet in battle, Spruance planned to employ major action plans from
FTP 188.92 These provided a mutually understood frame of reference and re-
quired the minimum of signaling—though if necessary, Spruance would de-
velop his own battle plans and distribute them by signal.93 Admiral Lee would
command the battle line, as before.94
CATCHPOLE and HAILSTONE
The anticipated Japanese response to FLINTLOCK did not occur. Majuro,
Roi-Namur, and Kwajalein were all seized without interference from Japanese
surface units. The reserve force moved to Eniwetok, initiating Operation
CATCHPOLE. Admiral Spruance set his sights on the Combined Fleet. Aerial re-
connaissance of Truk showed that major elements of the Japanese fleet were in
the Carolines. A powerful attack, HAILSTONE, was planned to cover the land-
ings at Eniwetok by neutralizing Truk and destroying any forces encoun-
tered.95 If the Japanese fleet did not come out to fight, Spruance would take the
fight to it.
Unlike previous major operations involving the fast carriers, HAILSTONE
did not have an amphibious component; CATCHPOLE was a separate operation.
HAILSTONE, however, was not just a raid but a deliberate attempt to destroy a
large portion of the Combined Fleet. All the fast battleships were concentrated
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into a single carrier group, TG 58.3, ready to deploy quickly and engage the en-
emy in the anticipated fleet action. The old battleships were left behind.96
By the time of the initial air strikes on 17 February 1944, the Japanese had
withdrawn their heavy units from Truk, but a large amount of shipping was dis-
covered and attacked in the lagoon. When a group of Japanese light forces at-
tempted to escape through the northern passage, Spruance detached a
high-speed surface striking force, TG 50.9, to intercept. Battleship Division 7
formed its core; two heavy cruisers and four destroyers were attached in
support.97 This was the first employment of the new battleship division in a role
that would often be assigned to it—pursuit and destruction of enemy ships.98
The high speed of the battleships made them especially well suited for it, and on
this occasion they were able to destroy four Japanese ships; a lone destroyer
escaped.
The creation and detachment of ad hoc units like this, with no opportunity to
train together, had produced unfortunate results fifteen months before off
Guadalcanal.99 PAC 10 and the recently issued USF 10A had made an important
difference, enabling tactical commanders to seize opportunities presented by
the rapid operational tempo.
The ships of TG 50.9 were not the only ones waiting to strike Japanese crip-
ples. Ten submarines had been sent to prowl the waters around Truk in concert
with the operation.100 On 16 February Skate sighted and torpedoed the cruiser
Agano, sinking it. The submarine’s place in the decisive battle had been found. In
future operations commanders ashore would strategically position submarines
to provide distant reconnaissance and to attack targets of opportunity.
Additional carrier raids followed. After the successful strike on Truk and the
enemy withdrawal from the Carolines, Spruance was free to range deeper into
the Japanese defensive system. On 23 February 1944, TF 58 struck Japanese air
bases in the Marianas, attacking the islands of Guam, Saipan, Tinian, and Rota.
On the last day of March and first of April, the fast carriers hit Palau and Yap. The
rapid pace of operations emphasized in the GRANITE plan was being sustained,
and it was keeping the pressure on the Japanese.
DESECRATE II
The invasion of Hollandia on the northern coast of New Guinea was a southwest
Pacific operation, not a Central Pacific one, but the JCS had decreed that the fast
carriers would support it.101 Seizure of the Japanese base complex between
Tanahmerah and Humboldt bays would provide General Douglas MacArthur’s
Southwest Pacific Force with an ideal position from which to further its advance
along the northern coast of the island.102 Admiral Nimitz remained, however, fo-
cused on the destruction of the Japanese Combined Fleet, the primary aim of
H O N E 8 1
15
Hone: U.S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine and Victory in the Pacific
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
GRANITE. On 23 March, during a visit to Brisbane, he emphasized the Navy’s pri-
orities to the general and made it clear that if the Japanese came out to fight,
their fleet would become the primary objective of the fast carrier force.103
The participation of TF 58 in the operation was code-named DESECRATE II.
Mitscher was in command. (Spruance and the Central Pacific Force’s amphibi-
ous elements remained behind, preparing for the invasion of the Marianas.) As
in FLINTLOCK, the fast carriers were to provide direct support to the assault
forces and suppress nearby Japanese airfields. Mitscher used three carrier task
groups: TG 58.1, which had no battleships, would range to the west and attack
Japanese airfields at Wakde, Sawar, and Sarmi;104 TG 58.2, with the two fast bat-
tleships of Battleship Division 7, was to support the landings in Humboldt Bay;
and TG 58.3, with four other fast battleships, would cover the landings in
Tanahmerah Bay.
This arrangement positioned the bulk of Mitscher’s surface striking power in
the center, facilitating concentration if the Japanese appeared in force. Should a
powerful battle fleet be required for a major action, six battleships, ten heavy
cruisers, three light cruisers, and twenty-two destroyers were to concentrate un-
der Admiral Lee; a carrier group, TG 58.1, would operate in direct support, un-
der Lee’s command.105 In battle, Lee expected to leverage plans and dispositions
from FTP 188 and USF 10A.106 The remaining two carrier groups, stripped of the
bulk of their escorts, would remain under Mitscher’s command and operate in
distant support.107
Two additional plans were developed, for minor action, should the Japanese
challenge with small forces. One teamed Lee’s six battleships with two destroyer
squadrons.108 The other was a pursuit force built around Battleship Division 7,
very similar to TG 50.9, which Spruance had sent around Truk; this time, the two
fast battleships would be matched with two heavy cruisers and seven destroyers.
Their preferred battle plan was “1E2,” from USF 10A—an engagement on paral-
lel courses at extreme range, with light forces on both flanks operating
defensively.109
DECISIVE BATTLE
By June 1944, Japanese bases in the Marshalls and Carolines had been seized or
neutralized, the major base at Rabaul had been rendered untenable, and the Al-
lies were rapidly advancing along the northern coast of New Guinea. It seemed
as if the Japanese were content to let their defensive perimeter crumble without
risking major fleet units, but this was about to change.
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FORAGER
The third major offensive of Spruance’s force, officially designated the Fifth
Fleet on 29 April 1944, was the seizure of the Marianas. Operation FORAGER
comprised the capture of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. Saipan would be attacked
first, on 15 June; landings on Guam were initially scheduled for three days later.
The assault on Tinian would follow, but the specific date remained flexible.110
Because the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines had not produced a fleet ac-
tion, the “prevailing opinion . . . was that the Japanese navy would not fight for
the Marianas.”111
But Spruance had to be prepared for that contingency, and his battle plan for
the Marianas changed little from those developed for earlier operations.112 As
before, he expected to concentrate all his battleships into one formation; seven
old ones supporting the amphibious assaults were to combine with seven fast
battleships from the carrier groups to give a total of fourteen. Supporting ships
would be drawn from the carrier task groups and assault forces. Concentration
and employment of his entire force remained fundamental elements of
Spruance’s plan.113 Concentration was also still a guiding principle of the em-
ployment of the fast battleships specifically: “In acting as a covering force have
[carrier] task groups which are screened by fast battleships operate in as close
tactical support of each other as the nature of their tasks and enemy action will
permit.”114
The increasing number of escort carriers in the invasion forces allowed the
primary focus of the fast carriers to become the suppression of enemy air bases,
rather than direct air support for the invasion. The plan called for the carriers to
start their attacks three days before the landings, but this date was advanced a
day, because of the “large estimated strength of enemy aircraft in the
Marianas.”115 On June 11, planes from Mitscher’s TF 58 struck Japanese posi-
tions on Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan. These attacks continued for the
next two days.
The carriers operated in four task groups: TG 58.1 attacked Guam, and the
other three hit Saipan and Tinian. The fast battleships were kept concentrated;
TG 58.2 contained the two high-speed battleships of Battleship Division 7, TG
58.3 the other five fast battleships. Finally, TGs 58.1 and 58.4 were supported by
cruisers.116 The night before the landings, these two groups were sent north to at-
tack the islands of Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima. The two other groups, with their
battleships, remained to cover the landing beaches and assault forces.
In the meantime, the Japanese had resolved to contest the landings. On 12
June, having received word of the strikes in the Marianas, the new commander
in chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Soemu Toyoda, issued orders to execute
Operation A-GO, his plan for a major fleet action. Three days later, he made his
H O N E 8 3
17
Hone: U.S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine and Victory in the Pacific
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
intention explicit: “The Combined Fleet will attack the enemy in the Marianas
area and annihilate the invasion force. Activate A-Go Operation for decisive bat-
tle.”117 A powerful fleet was assembled under the command of Vice Admiral
Jisaburo Ozawa, including nine carriers, five battleships, and eleven heavy cruis-
ers.118 This force approached the Marianas in two main groups. The carriers and
three battleships, with Ozawa embarked, left their base at Tawi Tawi in the
southern Philippines and sailed through the archipelago, transiting the San
Bernardino Strait. A second force, with the large battleships Yamato and
Musashi, came north from Batjan in the Moluccas and rendezvoused with
Ozawa in the Philippine Sea.
Spruance received word of these movements from submarines and realized
that a major action was possible if the Japanese continued their approach.119
During the night of 14–15 June, he ordered TGs 58.1 and 58.4 to cut short their
attacks on Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima and return for a rendezvous near Saipan on
18 June. On 16 June, he postponed the invasion of Guam and held a conference
with Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner, commander of the invasion force. The
two developed a plan of action to deal with the approaching threat.
Two aspects of the developing situation presented particular challenges for
Spruance. The battle for Saipan was still going on and limited his mobility; but
he had expected that the Japanese would strike before one or more of the islands
were secure all along.120 The fact that the Japanese were approaching in two dis-
tinct groups was a more significant problem. Spruance’s original plan had antic-
ipated that the Japanese might have two formations, a carrier group and an
advanced guard, but he had expected them to be within supporting distance.121
The sightings so far suggested instead two independent formations.
Therefore, rather than concentrating the entire Fifth Fleet as per the plan,
Spruance and Turner elected to strengthen TF 58 with five heavy cruisers, three
light cruisers, and twenty-one destroyers detached from the invasion forces. The
old battleships, three cruisers, and five destroyers were formed into a blocking
force and sent west of Saipan.122 This plan had two advantages: the blocking
force provided close cover for the Saipan beachhead, and TF 58 retained its mo-
bility by separating itself from the slower old battleships. On 17 June, in prepara-
tion for a surface action, Admiral Mitscher recommended detaching the
battleships entirely from the carrier task groups and placing them into a separate
formation.123 This would prevent the confusion that would inevitably result if
the battleships and their escorts had to form in the middle of an air battle.
Spruance concurred; the resulting TG 58.7 was placed under command of Ad-
miral Lee. It contained seven battleships, four heavy cruisers, and thirteen
destroyers.124
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Spruance then issued his battle plan. It called for air strikes to disable the en-
emy carriers and surface action by the battle line: “Our air will knock out enemy
carriers . . . then will attack enemy battleships and cruisers to slow or disable
them. Task Group 58.7 will destroy enemy fleet either by fleet action if enemy
elects to fight or by sinking slowed or crippled ships if enemy retreats.”125
Early on 18 June, when TGs 58.1 and 58.4 were to rejoin, a new submarine
contact suggested the Japanese were close enough for a surface action that night.
Mitscher asked Lee if he desired a night action.126 Lee declined emphatically:
“Do not[,] repeat[,] do not believe we should seek night engagement.”127 Lee’s
response reflected both his own experience and the limited training of his com-
mand.128 He had fought and won a night battle and knew how quickly such an
action could degenerate into a melee, particularly if the forces involved lacked
cohesion.129 Lee’s formation, formed on the spot from four different task groups,
could operate together in daylight, by virtue of the common doctrines of USF
10A, but it was not prepared for night action.130 Lee’s comments after his earlier
battle provide clues as to his state of mind at this point: “Our battleships are nei-
ther designed nor armed for close range night actions with enemy light forces. A
few minutes intense fire . . . from secondary battery guns can, and did, render
one of our new battleships deaf, dumb, blind and impotent through destruction
of radar, radio and fire control circuits.”131
Soon after Lee responded, Spruance decided against night action.132 He did
not want to get too far from the forces at Saipan and risk defeat in detail. It is
likely that he also wanted to ensure the concentration of all elements of TF 58;
TGs 58.1 and 58.4 had not yet rejoined. In his response, Spruance mentioned
concern at the prospect of a “diversionary attack” on the flank.133 Most interpre-
tations take this to mean that Spruance worried that a Japanese southern force
would slip beyond him to raid the invasion beaches, but there is another possi-
bility.134 Captured Japanese planning material, which Spruance had reviewed,
discussed “flanking,” but in another context—attacking an opposing carrier
force after its attack planes had been committed to another, less important, tar-
get.135 The Japanese believed they had been flanked in this sense at Midway, in
that their carriers had been struck by surprise from an unanticipated direction
while preoccupied with attacking Midway Island.136 They hoped to do the same
to the Americans in future battles, and since Spruance had come into possession
of a Japanese document discussing this approach, it is likely that he expected to
face such tactics.137 This explains his preference for remaining concentrated and
not striking in force until the Japanese had shown their hand.
Spruance’s emphasis on concentration continued to influence the developing
action. He did not accept Mitscher’s recommendation to detach TG 58.1 and op-
erate it to the northwest in order to cut off Ozawa’s escape route to the home
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islands.138 When a direction-finding fix from Pearl Harbor on 18 June placed the
Japanese formation approximately 355 miles to the west, Mitscher recom-
mended closing at night to launch a morning strike and get the battleships into
position.139 Spruance again refused, citing the possibility of an “end run.”140
With that decision, the chance for a decisive action was lost.
The details of the ensuing battle are well known.141 The Japanese sent a series
of air strikes against TF 58, but none succeeded in causing major damage; their
losses in planes and pilots were tremendous. Unable to sustain the attacks,
Ozawa turned toward Japan and began to withdraw. Spruance pursued, and on
the evening of the next day a long-range strike succeeded in sinking the carrier
Hiyo, but Spruance again refused to detach task forces.142 Before the action, Vice
Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, commander of the Pacific Fleet’s submarines,
stationed four of his boats in a square surrounding the area in which he believed
Ozawa’s forces would operate. On 19 June, two of them found their targets. Alba-
core sighted and torpedoed Ozawa’s flagship, Taiho, just after it had completed
launching its first strike; eight hours later Taiho sank, destroyed by the fires that
ultimately resulted. In the interim, three torpedoes from Cavella sank carrier
Shokaku.143
The outcome in the battle of the Philippine Sea, however, was not decisive,
even when the successes of submarines are considered. The Japanese were
soundly defeated, but the majority of their fleet units, including most of their
carriers and all their battleships, withdrew to fight again. Nonetheless, the first
phase of the decisive naval battle of the Pacific War, the carrier duel, was over.
KING II
In the summer of 1944, in order to keep up the rapid pace of operations in the
Pacific, Admiral Nimitz developed a second command for the Central Pacific
Force, parallel to that of Spruance. The two flags and their respective staffs
would command the same ships, alternately directing an operation and plan-
ning their next, thereby allowing less time between offensives and increasing the
pressure on the Japanese. Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of the Third
Fleet, was selected to be Spruance’s counterpart. When under Halsey’s com-
mand, the ships of the Central Pacific would be the Third Fleet; when Spruance
led them, they would once again become the Fifth Fleet.144
Halsey took Mitscher and the fast carriers, now TF 38, on a series of raids in
September 1944. They struck the Palaus, Mindanao, and the Visayas, covering
the invasions of Morotai, the Palaus, and Ulithi. The lack of resistance encoun-
tered convinced Halsey that the existing timetable for landings in the Philip-
pines could be accelerated. Within a matter of days, the JCS had approved the
new schedule.145
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The invasion of Leyte, code-named KING II, differed from previous large am-
phibious operations. The unity of command that had existed in GALVANIC,
FLINTLOCK, and FORAGER was absent. The Central Pacific and southwestern Pa-
cific offensives met in the southern Philippines, and KING II used forces from
both theaters. Command was divided between the two, hindering effectiveness
and leading to confusion during the naval battles that resulted.146 Halsey’s Third
Fleet retained the fast carriers, but the Central Pacific Force’s amphibious units,
including the old battleships and escort carriers, were transferred to the Seventh
Fleet, under command of Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, who was subordi-
nate to General MacArthur. Kinkaid led the amphibious assault.
As in FORAGER, the fast carriers were to suppress Japanese air bases and pro-
vide direct air support for the amphibious assault, but Halsey was freed of many
of the burdens his predecessor had faced in the Philippine Sea. Without the old
battleships and amphibious forces under his command, Halsey was able to de-
velop plans that took full advantage of the mobility of his task forces. He was also
free to seek out the Japanese; Nimitz’s plan for the operation stressed that “in
case opportunity for destruction of major portion of enemy fleet offers or can be
created, such destruction becomes the primary task.”147
Third Fleet battle plans stressed the importance of this task.148 They differed
from those of the Fifth Fleet in two important respects. Lacking the old battle-
ships, Halsey ignored them in his tactical planning and envisioned a battle line
composed of only fast battleships. This increased his flexibility, because all
forces in the battle fleet had sufficient speed to keep up with a carrier formation.
Halsey planned to capitalize on this with a well developed prewar technique.
Halsey planned a coordinated attack. He assumed that his four carrier
groups, far superior to what the Japanese could muster at this stage of the war,
would either win the opening carrier duel or sight the enemy too late in the day
for strike operations. In either case, the ensuing plan would be the same. Rather
than steaming away at night as Spruance had done, Halsey would approach and,
along the way, reorganize the carrier forces. Battleships, cruisers, and supporting
destroyers would leave their respective task groups and form TF 34, a battle for-
mation under the command of Admiral Lee, about seventy miles ahead of the
carriers. As morning approached, planes would ready and launch. The coordi-
nated movements of the fleet were designed to bring the attacking planes and
the battleships within range of the enemy at the same time, at dawn.149
Particular effort . . . will be made to gain a position from which a predawn carrier
strike may be launched concurrently with the release of fast heavy striking force from
a favorable attack position. Development of a favorable tactical situation . . . will be
effected by dispatching TF 34 and carrier air groups to attack the enemy. The ap-
proach will be so conducted as to give TF 34 an opportunity to strike from a
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favorable position and so coordinate its offensive efforts with those of carrier air
groups.150
Halsey considered this the “optimum plan for decisive action.”151 It would col-
lect nearly all the striking power of TF 38 into one decisive pulse and overwhelm
the Japanese. Halsey had revived the prewar coordinated attack.
The main landings took place on 20 October, with two of Halsey’s carrier
groups providing direct support. Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4, with cruisers in
support, attacked targets on Leyte and suppressed airfields on Mindanao and
the western Visayas.152 The two other carrier groups, TGs 38.2 and 38.3, re-
mained concentrated farther north, scouting for potential threats from the di-
rection of Japan and Formosa.153 Halsey kept all the battleships together: TG
38.2 had Battleship Division 7 (Iowa and New Jersey), and four battleships were
with TG 38.3.154
The possibility that the Japanese would commit significant naval forces to de-
fend the Philippines was not seriously considered in Third or Seventh Fleet
plans.155 This was a mistake; in the summer of 1944, the Japanese had created a
series of plans, code-named SHO-GO (Victory).156 The southernmost of these,
SHO-1, covered the defense of the Philippines.157 On the basis of preliminary
landings around Leyte, the Imperial General Headquarters made the decision to
implement SHO-1 on 18 October.158 Two days later, Vice Admiral Ryunosuke
Kuasaka, chief of staff to Combined Fleet commander Admiral Soemu Toyoda,
issued the final plans to units of the Combined Fleet.159
The Japanese moved toward Leyte in four elements. Vice Admiral Takeo
Kurita’s 1st Diversionary Attack Force divided in two, one part comprising his
1st and 2nd sections; led by Kurita himself, it would transit the San Bernardino
Strait. Kurita’s 3rd Section, commanded by Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura, was
ordered to pass through Surigao Strait. Kurita planned to reunite with
Nishimura in Leyte Gulf early on the morning of 25 October and destroy the in-
vasion forces.160 The third Japanese element, the 2nd Diversionary Attack Force,
under Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima, would come through Surigao Strait behind
Nishimura and also attack the invasion fleet. Between them, these three attack
forces had seven battleships, sixteen cruisers, and twenty-three destroyers.161
The fourth and last Japanese group, commanded by Vice Admiral Jisaburo
Ozawa, was a decoy. Ozawa took the Combined Fleet’s remaining carriers south
from Japan, hoping with them to draw the Third Fleet’s covering forces back
north, away from Leyte Gulf.162 Ozawa had four carriers, two battleship-carriers,
three cruisers, and nine destroyers.163
Halsey, still confident that the Japanese would not seek battle, was preoccu-
pied with preparations for the Third Fleet’s major follow-on operation, an
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attack against the Japanese home islands.164 On 22 October he sent TGs 38.4 and
38.1 to the fleet base at Ulithi to refuel and rearm. Before detaching them, he
took two battleships from TG 38.3 and transferred them to TG 38.4, to go with it
to Ulithi.165 Two task groups and just four fast battleships remained in the area.
The same day, Kurita’s 1st and 2nd sections left their anchorage at Brunei Bay
on the north coast of Borneo. U.S. submarines again provided early warning of
Japanese moves. The morning of 23 October, while transiting Palawan Passage,
the submarines Dace and Darter sighted and attacked Kurita’s ships, hitting
three heavy cruisers—Atago and Maya were sunk, Takao was damaged and
forced to retire.166 Halsey and Kinkaid received these sightings and additional
information from long-range air searches; they became convinced that the Japa-
nese were moving toward the Philippines in force. Halsey quickly realized his
dispositions were inadequate and recalled TG 38.4 and its two battleships. He
did not recall TG 38.1. That group had more planes available than TG 38.4, but
Halsey considered the two battleships more important.167
Halsey disposed his forces to allow effective aerial searches to the west and
provide warning of the Japanese approach. TG 38.3 was farthest to the north,
east of Polillo Island. He placed TG 38.2 in the center, off the San Bernardino
Strait, and TG 38.4 in the south, east of Samar.168 This arrangement dispersed
Halsey’s battleship strength—each task group had just two battleships—but al-
lowed him to cover the major passages through the archipelago.
On 24 October, Kurita and Nishimura were sighted by Halsey’s carriers. TG
38.4 subjected Nishimura to a single attack, slightly damaging two of his ships.
Since Kurita posed the greater threat, Halsey left Nishimura to Kinkaid and
moved quickly to consolidate his battleship strength: TG 38.4 was ordered
north; all three carrier groups would concentrate off the San Bernardino Strait,
launching strikes against Kurita’s formation along the way. Over the course of
several hours repeated air attacks sank the battleship Musashi and damaged sev-
eral other ships. In the early afternoon Kurita turned back, seeking relief from
the onslaught.169
In the meantime, Halsey had issued a preparatory battle order in expectation
of Kurita’s force exiting the strait. TGs 38.2 and 38.4 were close enough to con-
centrate; the plan combined Battleship Division 7 with the two battleships from
TG 38.4. Four battleships, five cruisers, and ten destroyers would form as a sur-
face striking unit. Admiral Lee would command the resulting formation, desig-
nated TF 34.170 Because TG 38.3 was too distant, its battleships were not
included. Halsey planned to make do with the forces immediately on hand.
He did not implement the plan; a variety of circumstances convinced him
otherwise. Scouting reports indicated that Kurita was withdrawing, heavily
damaged. Also, intelligence available to Halsey suggested that Japanese forces in
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the area of the home islands were stronger than in fact they were, and this led
him to the conclusion that the most serious threat would come from the
north.171 In the afternoon, planes from TG 38.3 found that threat: they sighted
Ozawa’s main body. Halsey considered his alternatives.
[The option of] leaving TF 34 to block San Bernardino Straits . . . was rejected; the
potential strength of the Northern Forces [Ozawa] was too great to leave unmolested,
and requiring TF 34 to engage the Center Force [Kurita] while at the same time ex-
posed to attack by land-based and carrier-based air attack was not sound. This alter-
native spread our strength and risked unprofitable damage in detail.172
During the evening of 24 October, Halsey made the decision to move north with
all his forces and pursue Ozawa.173
Along the way, he put his battle plan in motion. The fleet slowed as all six bat-
tleships, seven cruisers, and eighteen destroyers separated themselves from the
carrier groups and formed TF 34, under Lee. TG 38.2 was designated as the
battle-line carrier group, to support Lee’s surface forces.174 Mitscher expected
the surface contact to take place at 4:30 AM, but estimates of the Japanese posi-
tion were incorrect. The first air strike from the carriers hit Ozawa long before
TF 34 could come into action. Coordinated attacks would have to wait until the
battleships were in position.
Halsey ran out of time. As TF 34 approached the Japanese, urgent messages
were received from Kinkaid. Escort carriers on his northern flank were engaged
in a running battle with Kurita’s 1st and 2nd sections. The remnants of the 1st
Striking Force had reversed course, passed through the San Bernardino Strait,
and were now moving toward the landing beaches. Halsey sent TF 34, minus
four cruisers and nine destroyers, south to assist; TG 38.2 followed in support.175
The cruisers and destroyers detached from TF 34 filled in and formed a sur-
face striking force.176 They continued north and attacked Japanese ships dam-
aged by the carrier strikes, finishing off the carrier Chiyoda and sinking the
destroyer Hatsuzuki after a running gun battle.177 Ozawa’s other carriers,
Zuikaku, Zuiho, and Chitose, were sunk by planes from TF 38.178 The submarine
Jallao, coached to the scene with several consorts by Admiral Lockwood, sank
the light cruiser Tama, previously damaged by air attack.179 Demoralized and
broken, Ozawa’s force retreated. In the meantime, Nishimura’s 3rd Section had
steamed into a trap set by Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet in Surigao Strait and been vir-
tually annihilated.
Although Kinkaid had not anticipated that the Japanese would seek major ac-
tion, his forces had been well prepared for it. The Seventh Fleet’s battle plan
called for Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf ’s Fire Support Group, designated TG
77.2, and Rear Admiral Russell S. Berkey’s Close Covering Group, TG 77.3, to
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combine in the face of strong enemy opposition.180 Oldendorf had all six of the
old battleships supporting Leyte, along with escorting cruisers and destroyers;
he and his ships had been part of the Fifth Fleet’s offensives in the Central Pa-
cific.181 Berkey’s group was part of the multinational Seventh Fleet.182 Depend-
ing on the nature of the threat, Kinkaid planned to detach Berkey, Oldendorf, or
both. Kinkaid also envisioned combining Berkey’s group with units from the
Third Fleet if Japanese light forces threatened the invasion fleet.183 Details were
left up to the individual commanders. USF 10A was perfect in situations like
these, in which disparate task groups would come together for battle; Oldendorf
would put it to good use.
By noon on 24 October, Kinkaid had realized that the Japanese were seeking
major action and ordered Oldendorf to prepare for a night battle in Surigao
Strait and to take Berkey’s TG 77.3 in support.184 Oldendorf began to formulate a
plan. He called Berkey and his battle-line commander, Rear Admiral George L.
Weyler, to his flagship so he could familiarize them with the details. The battle-
ships were loaded mainly with bombardment ammunition; Oldendorf stressed
the need to fire at medium ranges, where the effect would be maximized. He also
discussed the use of destroyer attacks before the main action; he planned to send
them down both sides of the strait.185
After the conference, Oldendorf signaled his battle plan to the six battleships,
eight cruisers, and twenty-one destroyers of his force. The battle plan specified
disposition “A-2” from USF 10A, intended for the employment of task forces like
this one.186 “A-2” (see figure 2) placed the battle line in the center and light forces
at either flank.187 This was an efficient arrangement for the confined waters at
the head of the strait, and it maximized the effectiveness of Oldendorf ’s gunfire.
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The plan worked to perfection, including one small, extemporized addition.
Picket destroyers from TG 79.11 commanded by Captain Jesse G. Coward were
the first to attack.188 Coward had joined Oldendorf on his own initiative, dis-
playing the aggressiveness inherent in the Navy’s doctrine.189 Nishimura’s at-
tempt to penetrate into Leyte Gulf failed, disorganized by a series of destroyer
torpedo attacks and shattered by battleship and cruiser gunfire. One destroyer
and a badly damaged cruiser were all that survived to retreat down the strait.
Following in Nishimura’s wake, Shima’s 2nd Diversionary Attack Force “fired
ineffective torpedoes at radar ghosts to the north” and quickly withdrew.190
Soon thereafter, Kurita’s force reappeared off Samar, within visual range of
Kinkaid’s escort carriers. A desperate fight ensued; both Halsey and Kinkaid
mustered powerful forces to counter the threat.191 Kinkaid ordered Oldendorf to
send a battleship division, a heavy cruiser division, and supporting destroyers to
assist the carriers. Oldendorf chose to send the three battleships that had the
most armor-piercing ammunition remaining, all four of his heavy cruisers, and
twenty destroyers, all of which had at least five torpedoes.192
As we have seen, Halsey sent TF 34 and TG 38.2 south to support Kinkaid, but
they would not find Kurita. Shortly after noon on 25 October, he had turned to
the north and headed back toward the San Bernardino Strait. When this became
apparent, Halsey ordered TG 34.5, a pursuit force formed around Battleship Di-
vision 7, to separate from TF 34 and go after the retreating enemy.193
The pursuit force contained two battleships, three cruisers, and eight destroy-
ers under the command of Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger. Halsey’s intention was
for Badger to employ battle disposition “A-1” (see figure 3) from USF 10A, con-
centrating all light forces in the van.194 TF 34.5 would engage on parallel courses
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at long range, with light forces on the offensive.195 This was battle plan “1L1.”
Badger arrived too late to engage Kurita but in the darkness found destroyer
Nowaki, which had remained behind to pick up survivors, and sank it. The battle
of Leyte Gulf was over.
Japanese efforts to contest the landings in the Philippines and Marianas had
led to the decisive battle both navies had anticipated before the war.196 Although
the expected clash of battle lines did not occur, the outcome was decisive. The re-
maining Japanese surface forces lacked the fuel and strength necessary to chal-
lenge further offensives; the Combined Fleet had become a hollow shell.
PREWAR PRINCIPLES AND WARTIME LESSONS
Several important elements of the Navy’s tactical doctrine contributed to the
success of the rapid offensive through the Central Pacific. The new approach to
the development and dissemination of doctrine introduced by the Pacific Fleet
in the summer of 1943 prepared it to divide itself into a series of carrier-centric
task forces and ensured that when the fleet came together in the face of enemy
surface threats, it could act as a cohesive unit. This approach rectified the short-
comings of prewar doctrinal development by relieving task force commanders
of the burden of creating battle plans and doctrines for their forces.
Principles of prewar doctrine also contributed to success. The most obvious
of these was the depth and richness of the Navy’s prewar major action plans,
which relied on concentration of all available forces and cooperative action
against the enemy battle line. The influence of these principles can be seen in the
major action plans developed by Spruance, Mitscher, and Halsey. The coordi-
nated attack attempted by the Third Fleet was derived directly from prewar
concepts.
The synthesis of prewar principles and wartime lessons in PAC 10 and USF
10A also benefited lower-level commanders, who consistently relied upon them.
The way Lee and Oldendorf leveraged the new manuals to ensure cooperation
and common understanding has been described.197 Other commanders, includ-
ing Badger, Weyler, Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth, and Rear Admiral Giffen,
employed them the same way.198 Use of these doctrinal manuals became perva-
sive—and this was essential. Because the standard operational formations were
fast carrier groups, surface commanders could not assume they would be able to
concentrate all ships of their battle formations for practice or indoctrination.
Coordinated action could only be ensured through specific common doctrines
provided at the fleet level or above.
However, the Navy’s approach was not without its flaws. The worst of these
was the failure to anticipate Japanese responses to the increasing size and power
of the U.S. carrier forces. The Japanese addressed the problem in several ways,
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two of which are relevant here.199 The first was continued emphasis on a poten-
tial equalizer that had been an important part of their surface warfare doctrine
for years—night battle. The second was the use of divided dispositions and dis-
persed formations.
Both of these responses were asymmetric, and the Navy did not deal with
them effectively. This was particularly true of night combat. Existing doctrinal
principles, reinforced by prewar exercises and wartime lessons, stressed that
night action was undesirable, dangerous to powerful surface units. Concen-
trated formations of light forces could win minor battles at night, but major ac-
tions were to be fought in daylight. Spruance and Lee showed no desire to
challenge these principles on the night of 18 June in the Philippine Sea and, as a
result, missed an opportunity to force the Japanese into a decisive battle. Four
months later, Oldendorf ’s ad hoc task force achieved overwhelming victory at
Surigao Strait, suggesting what might have been.
The second Japanese response that caused problems touched upon a solidly
entrenched principle of the U.S. Navy’s tactical doctrine, concentration. Con-
centration was considered essential to the effectiveness of a battle fleet. Prewar
plans assumed that the Japanese approach to decisive battle would also empha-
size concentration and that major actions would accordingly be fought between
massed formations. The Japanese use of dispersed task groups in the carrier bat-
tles of 1942 should have challenged this assumption, but it did not. Even in 1944,
by which time the U.S. Navy had sufficient strength to divide into multiple task
forces and fight two battles simultaneously, it developed no major action plans
to counter dispersed enemy formations.
Spruance and Halsey emphasized concentration in their battle and opera-
tional plans. This conservative approach, driven by the fear of defeat in detail,
limited their opportunities when the Japanese gave battle. In the battle of the
Philippine Sea, Spruance repeatedly insisted on remaining concentrated and re-
fused to capitalize upon the mobility and flexibility of his multiple carrier task
forces. This reluctance allowed the Japanese to strike the first blow and permit-
ted them to withdraw when their attacks failed. Halsey was presented with a per-
fect opportunity to finish off the Combined Fleet at Leyte; a judicious division
of forces would have allowed him to defeat both Kurita and Ozawa on 25 Octo-
ber. But Halsey did not seriously consider divided action.200
The lesson was learned eventually, but too late. In his analysis of the October
fighting, Vice Admiral George D. Murray, Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet,
wrote, “Concentration, though usually sound, may sometimes be pursued too
far, with diminishing returns. The ability to divide forces cleverly, as developed
by the enemy, and to ‘unconcentrate’ quickly, may often be an advantage.”201 Un-
fortunately, the failure to recognize and adapt to Japanese asymmetries had
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already prevented Spruance and Halsey from crushing the Combined Fleet in a
single decisive blow.
Ultimately, it made no difference—Leyte Gulf destroyed Japan as a naval
power. This victory was achieved not just by success in battle but through sus-
tained campaigning. The Central Pacific offensive is an illuminating example of
the benefits of prioritizing strategic, operational, and tactical goals appropri-
ately. The main strategic objective, the defeat of Japan, was paramount. It was
achieved by a sustained offensive through the Japanese defensive perimeter. This
offensive had two subsidiary goals, maintenance of a rapid operational tempo
and defeat of the Japanese surface fleet.
Airplanes and airpower—particularly the Pacific Fleet’s carriers, but also its
land-based air forces—were essential to securing the first of these goals. The fast
carriers were the engine that drove the fast pace of operations, suppressing Japa-
nese positions, destroying planes and ships, and enabling amphibious
landings.202 Accordingly, the Pacific Fleet organized itself around carrier task
forces, because only they could ensure a fast pace of operations.
The second goal, the destruction of the Japanese fleet, required a battle, a tac-
tical component of a larger operation. Even though this was a strategic goal, its
tactical nature gave it, appropriately, a secondary priority—carriers, and the op-
erational tempo they enabled, were paramount. This fact limited the opportuni-
ties for battle-line commanders to train with their units and develop cohesion,
and it led to Lee’s decision to decline a night battle at the Philippine Sea.203 But
the overall rewards justified such decisions.
This outcome contrasts starkly with the opportunities the Japanese lost by in-
verting the priority of their strategic and tactical planning. They developed a so-
phisticated tactical doctrine for major fleet action, around which they developed
operations and strategy—with predictable, and unfortunate, results.204
The success of the U.S. Navy’s approach and the emphasis placed on carrier
airpower have overshadowed the important role battleships played in the Navy’s
tactical doctrine. The long-awaited clash of battle lines never occurred; this fact,
coupled with the dominant role of the carriers in the last eighteen months of the
war, has led to the conclusion that battleships were relegated to supporting roles
during the Central Pacific offensive.205 The foregoing analysis has shown this
traditional view to be false. Battleships were an essential element of the Navy’s
plan for decisive battle and therefore collectively an essential part of the cam-
paign. Every plan for major action developed during the Central Pacific offen-
sive relied on the employment of a battle fleet. In this respect, Spruance, though
often considered to have been a “battleship admiral,” was no different from
Halsey and Mitscher.206
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When Halsey and Spruance emphasized concentration, it was the concentra-
tion of battleships that concerned them. Spruance always kept the bulk of his
battleship strength together: at Makin in the Gilberts, off Kwajalein in the Mar-
shals, in TG 58.3 at Truk, and around Saipan in the Marianas. Halsey, once he
knew the avenue of Kurita’s approach, quickly moved to mass his battleships.
When he went after Ozawa, all the battleships came with him, and when TF 34
reversed course, they all headed south again. It was only after Leyte Gulf and the
decisive defeat of Japanese surface units that battleships began to be distributed
evenly among the fast carrier groups on a regular basis and moved to supporting
roles.207
In the immediate postwar period, wartime experience was reviewed, and les-
sons were compiled into a new series of tactical manuals. The comprehensive,
single-volume format of USF 10B was discarded; numerous additions to the
core originally adopted from PAC 10 over the course of the war had made the
document large and unwieldy. Material from it and other manuals was collected
in several new volumes issued in 1946 and 1947: U.S.F. 2, General Tactical In-
structions, United States Fleets; U.S.F. 4, Carrier Task Force Tactical Instructions,
United States Fleets; U.S.F. 5, Surface Action and Tactics, United States Fleets; and
U.S.F. 15, CIC Instructions, United States Fleets.208
Nimitz, now Chief of Naval Operations, oversaw the issuance of the new
manuals. The introduction of USF 5 borrowed directly from PAC 10:
USF 5 is not intended nor shall it be construed as depriving any officer exercising tac-
tical command of authority to issue special instructions to his command. USF 5,
however, should make such instructions unnecessary under ordinary circumstances
and should minimize them in extraordinary circumstances. The ultimate aim is to
obtain essential uniformity without unacceptable sacrifice of flexibility.209
The new manuals retained both the doctrines developed before the war that
proved effective and those produced during it. They offered tactics for units
large and small.210 The range bands and battle-plan designators first introduced
in Tentative Fleet Dispositions and Battle Plans of 1930 were reissued in USF 5.211
Coordinated attacks were still considered effective.212 The problems of combat
with small units, the “minor tactics” first seriously addressed by PAC 10, formed
a large part of the new surface warfare manual.213
The synthesis of prewar principles and wartime lessons introduced by the Pa-
cific Fleet in 1943 was validated by the successful conclusion of the campaign
and defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The new approach enabled employ-
ment of fast carrier task forces in a way that allowed a rapid offensive. Detailed
operational and tactical plans completed the picture, preparing the Pacific Fleet
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to thwart Japanese countermoves and to triumph, even if not as thoroughly as
desired, in the decisive battle.
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